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Abstract
This project is intended to fill an important gap in a database management system called
AngraDB: security. By using such systems, users need to be identified uniquely, so that
their actions can be tracked and, most importantly, controlled. With that motivation,
this work developed authentication and authorization schemes, following AngraDB’s core
idea of modularity and flexibility, and, given the sensitive nature of these systems, it has
also implanted the SSL protocol upon the existing transport layer, all using the language
Erlang, just as it is on the greatest part of the database project. These schemes were
created considering other known databases as comparative models, such as MongoDB
and CouchDB, and were also result of research about de facto standards, especially in
regard to authentication and password hashing. Soon, this project will add some more
security modules, such as data encryption and audit modules.
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The amount of data that is processed daily over the world has already reached strato-
spheric levels, and it keeps growing, more and more. The conventional relational databases
may not be the best option to deal with this data, since a great part of it is classified as
non structured or semi structured data, such as emails, media files — audios, videos and
images — and documents in general.
As an alternative to these relational databases, which are powered by SQL (Struc-
tured Query Language), emerged the concept of NoSQL, also known as “Not Only SQL”.
Databases that use this concept can either store structured or non structured data, and
are optimized to handle data like this.
Many great companies invested in the development of NoSQL databases, like Google,
Amazon and Apache. As a result of these efforts, we now have broadly used NoSQL
databases, such as Amazon DynamoDB, Google BigTable, Apache CouchDB, Apache
Cassandra, MongoDB and so the list goes.
Given this scenario, in 2016, a group a students from the Department of Computer
Science of University of Brasília (CiC-UnB), under the leadership of Prof. Dr. Rodrigo
Bonifácio, started the development of a project called AngraDB: a highly configurable,
scalable, and highly available NoSQL database.
Among many semi categories of NoSQL, AngraDB fits one of the most known and
adopted databases, which are the document-oriented ones: databases that focus on the
storage of semi structured documents, the most common being JSON files. MongoDB and
Apache CouchDB may be cited as very popular examples of document-oriented databases.
The project has been growing fastly. Besides the core functionalities, other plugins
and modules were being developed, such as drivers to other languages like Java, Python
and Ruby, an HTTP module, which turns possible to communicate with the core module
via HTTP, and so on. Yet, this project holded a huge blank: security.
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1.1 Problem Statement
Even though many people in this project have been putting effort on developing new
functionalities for AngraDB, it still did not have any features related to security, in any
ambit.
Authorization is one feature that is actually very common in many other database
management systems (DBMSs). It relates to permission control, i.e., which actions a user
can or cannot perform given some specific scope of the database. This relevant feature
was still missing in our AngraDB project.
Unfortunately, the lack of an authorization mechanism comes together with other
issues. In order to be able to give permissions for a specific user, or even check whether a
user has or not some permission to execute a certain action, the system needs also to have
the abstraction of user. In other words, our database also needed to be able to identify
each user uniquely, so that we could manage authorization upon them. This particular
issue can be included in a scope called Authentication.
Concluding this list of issues of this work, we have the problem that some user, when
connected to AngraDB, might need to transmit some sensitive information. For example,
when authenticating himself on the application, the user, depending on the authentication
scheme, can send a password. This scenario makes it explicit the need of a secure
communication channel between the user and the running database.
1.2 Objectives
The main objective of this work is to design and implement a set of security mechanisms
on top of AngraDB. Given the nature of being highly configurable— based on the fact
that AngraDB was conceived as a flexible and modular system—this work focused on the
following items:
• Review the architecture of AngraDB core module, in order to analyze and state
where to accommodate the changes that will be made.
• Prepare AngraDB to work with different implementations of both Authentication
and Authorization modules, in order to maintain the characteristic of being highly
configurable.
• Review and compare how other known database management systems (MongoDB
and CouchDB) deal with the three security topics mentioned in the Problem section.
• Review some core concepts of cryptography that will be used both on authentication
(for password hashing) and on establishing a secure communication channel.
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• Review and bring the Secure Socket Layer (SSL)/Transport Layer Security (TLS)
security protocol to AngraDB, and make it a possible configuration within our
Database Management System (DBMS).
• Propose and implement one authorization module based on permissions and two
different authentication modules, to reinforce the flexibility of AngraDB. One of
which will be based on a challenge-response scheme, and the other one on digital
certificates.
1.3 How This Document Is Organized
Besides the Introduction and Conclusion, this monograph is divided into the following
chapters:
• A Background About AngraDB — this chapter will approach AngraDB, describing
what it is, its story, its top-level architecture and how it communicates externally.
Besides that, some Erlang concepts that are judged to be essential to this work are
also approached;
• Cryptography And Related — this chapter will present some cryptography topics that
were used as basis for some points of this work, using a more informal approach, to
make it easier for someone who does not have previous knowledge in cryptography
to understand, even if minimally, what was done in this project;
• The Security Architecture of AngraDB — this is the heart of this work. This chapter
talks about AngraDB’s security requirements and explains the top-level designs
that were developed for each of these requirements. In the end of this chapter, a
subjective evaluation of this security design is made through possible attack models;
• The Implementation — finally, details about the implementation of the whole se-
curity architecture and also of each mechanism that was developed are discussed in
this chapter, including how the flexibility of the new security scheme was designed.
All the code that has been developed in this work can be found in the AngraDB repos-
itory, on the security branch (https://github.com/Angra-DB/core/tree/security).
3
Chapter 2
A Background About AngraDB
AngraDB is a Database Management System (DBMS) that features scalability, high avail-
ability and a flexible modular architecture, designed to be a greatly configurable system.
It focuses on storing files in JSON format, and, hence, can be classified as a document-
oriented database. Consequently, it fits in a broader concept of NoSQL databases, which
are basically databases that can store either structured or non structured data.
Among some other projects inside AngraDB’s repository (https://github.com/Angra-DB/),
is the one called AngraDB Core. This, as the name sugest, is the main project of An-
graDB.
The project Core is responsible for the creation and maintenance of processes that will
handle and manage persistence itself, and processes that will handle connections that are
made via Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) [5].
Because of AngraDB’s goals in scalability and high availability, the language chosen
for the construction of its core was Erlang [6], a functional programming language devel-
oped by Ericsson that makes it easy to create and manage processes, and also to handle
concurrency.
2.1 AngraDB Core’s Architecture
AngraDB Core’s structure counts on an Erlang abstraction of supervisors and workers.
Inside this concept, supervisors are processes whose main purpose is to watch their child
processes, and take some predefined action if any of these processes die. Among the
actions that might be taken in these occasions, the supervisor can simply instantiate
another child, just as it can kill all the other child processes and instantiate new ones. On
the other hand, workers are ordinary processes that can do whatever they were previously
programmed to do.
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Figure 2.1: AngraDB Core’s supervision tree.
Considering the previous explanation, Figure 2.1 and Table 2.1 of supervisors and their
purposes, it is now possible to understand thoroughly how AngraDB Core is architectured.
The flow of process instantiation, as soon as AngraDB Core application starts, is
to first initialize the main supervisor process, referred to in Figure 2.1 as "ADB Main
Supervisor"; it immediately instantiates its two child processes: Persistence Supervisor
and Server Supervisor. Soon thereafter, Server Supervisor starts the first socket server,
which needs to be created right away so that it can listen to new connections as soon as
possible.
The other processes shown in Figure 2.1 are created only when certain actions are
taken at run-time. For example, a Database Supervisor is only started by Persistence Su-
pervisor when a user asks to connect to a certain database. Right after created, Database
Supervisor also instantiates Reader and Writer Supervisors. In turn, Reader and Write
Supervisors, even though they seem to work in similar ways, they have an important differ-
ence: read operations can be performed concurrently, however, write operations cannot.
Because of this, a Writer Supervisor instantiates only one process for write operations
and another for indexation, while a Reader Supervisor instantiates a new read process
whenever asked for a read action.
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Table 2.1: Purpose of each supervisor of AngraDB Core.
Supervisor Purpose
ADB Main Supervisor Instantiate Persistence Supervisor and ServersSupervisor and watch them
Persistence Supervisor Instantiate databases supervisors when asked toand then watch them
Server Supervisor Instantiate a new TCP Server when a connectionis established and watch these TCP servers
Database Supervisor Instantiate a Reader Supervisor and a Writer Supervisoras soon as instantiated, and watch them
Read Supervisor When asked to, instantiate a process that will dealwith a read operation and watch them
Write Supervisors Instantiate and watch two processes: one that will dealwith write operations and another to deal with indexation
2.2 Important Erlang Concepts Used In AngraDB
Several concepts and resources from Erlang programming language helped the AngraDB
team build the project. However, some of them were key to the development of this work,
specifically.
The main concept that we are talking about is called "Behaviour". A Behaviour, to be
a little more specific, is a design principle broadly used in applications that are developed
using Erlang.
The core idea of a Behaviour is to reuse structures that need to be repeated many
times along an application. By using the Behaviour concept, an Erlang common module
— which is merely a source file written in Erlang and exports a handful of functions —
is separated into two other modules, one of which is called "Behaviour Module" and, the
other, "Callback Module".
A Behaviour Module, as the name suggests, is the module which will hold all the
common behaviours of the structures of which there is a desire to reuse code. The specific
parts of the source code will stay inside the Callback Modules. Inside a Callback Module,
whose name is also suggestive, there will be defined the callback functions that are going
to be used by the Behaviour Module. These callback functions are to be specified within
the Behaviour Module itself. Thus, they can be interpreted as something like a contract
between the Behaviour Module and the Callback Modules.
This Erlang "Behaviour" design principle looks a lot like the well-known Template
Method design pattern [1], in which a base class defines a shared code skeleton, but lets
some abstract (or concrete, but overridable) functions that are called inside this skeleton
to be implemented by its sub-classes.
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Figure 2.2: Comparation between Template Method and Erlang’s Behaviour design pat-
terns (Template Method UML taken from [1]).
Drawing a parallel to this line of thought, the behaviour modules would be like the
base classes, by defining the skeleton of shared code, just as the callback modules would
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be like the sub-classes, by implementing the specific functions that are to be called in the
middle of the shared code. Figure 2.2 reinforces this comparation.
To bring this matter a little closer to our scenario, we can observe the recently men-
tioned Supervision Tree, illustrated in Figure 2.1, which founds the architecture of An-
graDB Core. Inside this tree, many of these processes are supervisors, that is, their main
purpose is to create and watch their child processes, and take a specific action when
any of these processes die. Thus, the only basic differences between them are their child
processes and those mentioned specific actions.
Having this said, it is simple to conclude that "Supervisor" should then be a behaviour
module. "Supervisor" is actually a default behaviour module defined within Erlang/OTP.
The job of the AngraDB Core team, when developing those supervisors, was to imple-
ment the callback functions that specify the child processes and the strategy used on the
supervision of these very processes.
Going a little further on the usage of the "behaviour" concept inside AngraDB Core,
we can also take all the worker processes from Figure 2.1 as an example of behaviour
usage.
All these workers — Reader, Writer, Indexer and TCP Server modules — are actually
servers (which might be obvious for the TCP Server module, but not for the rest). Each
of these mentioned workers are callback modules of an Erlang default behaviour module
called "gen_server", which stands for "Generic Server".
This Generic Server behaviour contains everything necessary to make it possible to
trade messages with other generic servers or with any other application via sockets. The
only must of the above mentioned modules is to tell what to do when a message is received,
and they do that by implementing the behaviour module’s specified callbacks.
2.3 How AngraDB Core Communicates With The
World
We have just clarified the main internal architecture and some important Erlang concepts
that were already in use in AngraDB Core and were also used during the development
of this work, so, now, it is important for us to put in the table how the AngraDB Core
establishes connections and communicates with the outside world.
Among some options of protocols to establish the client/server communication, such as
User Datagram Protocol (UDP), the one that was chosen by the AngraDB Core team in
the end was Transmission Control Protocol (TCP), which is a protocol from the transport
layer of the TCP/IP network stack that takes care of handling the data exchange between
hosts, and is the de facto standard for client/server communication over the network,
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being widely used in other known applications, like MongoDB, Apache CouchDB, Oracle
Database and so on.
Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) has some advantages over other protocols, like
flow control, which prevents the hosts from receiving data faster than they can handle,
guarantees the order and the integrity of the packets, and so on. All these features might
be one of the reasons why this protocol is so widely used, since the other common option
is UDP, which do not have any of these characteristics (but it is still an option because
of the fact of being faster than TCP, which also comes from the lack of the mechanisms
present in TCP). (More on TCP can be found in its specification [5])
The usage and implementation of this protocol, inside AngraDB Core, is thoroughly
in charge of some of the previously mentioned workers that implement the "gen_server"
behaviour module, as superficially explained in the last sections. Now it is time to check
some details about these workers.
From the workers that implement callbacks for the gen_server behaviour, the ones that
handle external communication via TCP are called "ADB Servers" inside our project.
As mentioned before, one process instance of a ADB Server is created right when the
AngraDB Core application is initialized. This is done so that the core application can
always listen to new TCP connections. Continuing the thought, this instance of ADB
Server, when a new client asks to connect, begins the TCP handshake right away, and, if
these handshake steps finish successfully, it immediately requests the Server Supervisor to
instantiate a new ADB Server, so that this new process can listen to new connections while
this previous ADB Server handles the communication with the client that just connected.
If some error occurs during the handshake, that ADB Server dies and a new one is created,
to keep on listening again. This process repeats whenever a new client tries to connect
with AngraDB Core. A simple overview of this scheme can be seen on Figure 2.3.
Regarding to the implementation of these ADB Servers, the only things that needed
to be done were setting the child specifications on the Server Supervisor, indicating what
to instantiate when asked to start a child, and implementing the callbacks from the
"gen_server" behaviour module that are used to handle incoming messages, in order to
parse these very messages, and then interpret the commands inside them properly.
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Cryptography is considered very important to this work, since the pillars of almost every
topic of this project — mainly authentication and transport layer security — are directly
related to it. So, this chapter will be dedicated to cover objectively some Cryptography
topics that were useful for this work.
These topics that were needed to build this project are: Cryptographic Hash Functions,
which are necessary in the authentication scheme — for password hashing, to be more
specific —, and Digital Certificates, which also involves Public-key Cryptography and
Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), and they were all used to set up the transport layer
security, and also used in the certificate-based authentication mechanism (more on that
in the next chapter).
3.1 Introduction to Cryptography
The traditional concept of Cryptography emerged from the necessity of secrecy while
transmitting messages over an insecure communication channel. In other words, the
fundamental objective of Cryptography is to enable two (or more) parties to communicate
over insecure media — which may be simply letters over the post service, or a telephone
line, or a computer network — without letting untrusted people understand the content
of the original messages that are being traded.
This is one of the most basic problems of cryptography. From it, a large number
of encryption schemes — protocols that allow trusted parties to communicate secretly
between them — were born. All these encryption schemes use to reproduce two steps:
the encryption, which is a process applied by the sender party that turns the original
messages (which are also called "plaintext") into cyphertext; and the decryption, which
is, this time, applied by the receiver, transforming the cyphertext back into plaintext.
Furthermore, to keep untrusted parties from figuring out the original content of the mes-
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sages, both the encryption and decryption processes need an extra input: a key, which is
an element that will not be known by eavesdroppers. This key can be the same for both
the processes, originating a branch that is commonly called "symmetric cryptography", or
can be unique for each of the processes, what can be called "asymmetric cryptography"
or "public key cryptography". This is only one of the many classifications of encryption
schemes, although it is also one of the most important ones. (more on [7], [8], [9], [10])
Even though cryptography arose as a way to trade messages stealthily in an insecure
communication channel, many other subjects started to get encompassed to cryptography
as well, such as digital signatures, certificates, message authenticity and integrity, pseudo-
random generators, hashing, and so on.
3.2 Cryptographic Hash Functions
In order to understand the concept of Cryptographic Hash Functions, it is important to,
first, understand what hashing is about, and also its applications.
A hash function itself has the fundamental objective of transforming or compressing
its input — which is data in general, in different formats and different sizes — in a string
called "digest" or "hash code", which will be outputted in a fixed length, acting as a
fingerprint for this input data (as you can see in Figure 3.1). Decent hash functions tend
to distribute the digests as uniformly as possible, and also to generate digests that look
as random as possible.
Hash functions are very popular in many applications, algorithms and data structures,
for example, in cases such as indexing in databases, which, in this case, has the objective
of shortening the time needed to access information inside this database (see [11]); also,
indexing in tables directly, in structures that are called Hash Tables, and so it goes.
Some other known uses of hash functions, such as ensuring the authenticity and in-
tegrity of messages , transactions and data in general (that is, hashing used for Message
Authentication Code (MAC) and Manipulation Detection Code (MDC)), or "protecting"
passwords inside a database — which is exactly the usage of hashing that we a re looking
for in this work —, demand some special requirements, which are actually achieved by
cryptographic hash functions.
Cryptographic hash functions, according to [12, p. 323-330] and [13], should satisfy
three properties:
• preimage-resistance — for essentially all pre-specified outputs, it is computationally
infeasible to find any input which hashes to that output, i.e., to find any preimage
x′ such that h(x′) = y when given any y for which a corresponding input is not
known.
12
Figure 3.1: Example of a hash function (image taken from [2]).
• 2nd-preimage resistance — it is computationally infeasible to find any second input
which has the same output as any specified input, i.e., given x, to find a 2nd-
preimage x′ 6= x such that h(x) = h(x′).
• collision resistance — it is computationally infeasible to find any two distinct inputs
x, x′ which hash to the same output, i.e., such that h(x) = h(x′).
Notes:
1. Collision resistance implies 2nd-preimage resistance of hash functions.
2. Collision resistance does not guarantee preimage resistance.
Alternate Terminology: Alternate terms used in the literature are as follows:
preimage resistant ≡ one-way; 2nd-preimage resistance ≡ weak collision resistance; colli-
sion resistance ≡ strong collision resistance. [12].
Reminder: This work will take a more informal and objective approach. For formal
definitions, examples of attacks on usages of cryptographic hash functions, types of forgery
and so on, check [12], [13], [2].
Even though it is a point that ordinary hash functions may also achieve, the ran-
domness is also a property that need to be present and reinforced in cryptographic hash
functions. For example, see the Figure 3.2. It is possible to observe that, just because one
letter changed to upper case, the whole digest changed. This point is important because
it supports the preimage-resistance property, since it makes it harder — or even infeasible
— to correlate information from the output to the input.
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Figure 3.2: Simple example of the randomness of SHA-1, a widely known cryptographic
hash function (image taken from [3]).
3.2.1 Cryptographic Hash Algorithms
There are many and many algorithms of cryptographic hash functions nowadays, but we
can separate the most popular ones, which are: the Message Digest (MD) algorithm family
(being MD4 and MD5 the most popular ones), which were developed by Ronald Rivest,
and, of course, the Secure Hashing Algorithm (SHA) family (which got really popular with
SHA-1, SHA-2 and SHA-3, the newest one), algorithms developed by National Institute
of Standards and Technology (NIST) and supported by the USA Government — which
is probably the reason of their popularity upon other algorithms such as the RIPEMDs,
that were developed in parallel to the SHA family.
Notes:
1. For details on algorithms listed above and how they work, check [12, p. 344-351];
2. An interesting table with a longer list of cryptographic hash functions and compar-
isons between them can be found at [14].
Even being cited above as the most popular cryptographic hash functions, some of
them have fallen into disuse, because of vulnerabilities and weaknesses that were being
found along the years.
First, there was MD4, but many true weaknesses were being reported for this algo-
rithm. Later, as an effort to try to strengthen MD4, MD5 was designed. In the beginning,
it was well accepted, and became popular, but vulnerabilities came to the fore as well. A
while later, collisions on both algorithms could be found in matter of minutes, even using
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a regular computer. Once these collision attacks were found on MD4 and MD5, people
tended to stop using them.
Based on MD5, National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) came up with
the Secure Hashing Algorithm (SHA) (also called SHA-0), altering some points, such as
the length of the digest (MD5 was 128 bits long, while Secure Hashing Algorithm (SHA)
was 160 bits long), and, after few adjustments (only a little operation on its compression
function), launched the well known SHA-1, which was the de facto standard for a relatively
long period as well.
Since 2005, theoretical vulnerabilities on the SHA-1 were reported. Even though
these vulnerabilities were only theoretical, it was enough for the community to start
questioning the algorithm’s security. Just for curiosity, only in 2017, was Google able to
make a successful collision attack on SHA-1, by modifying a PDF without changing its
SHA-1 digest, "killing" SHA-1 for good [15], [16], [17]. (Fore details on the weaknesses,
vulnerabilities and collision attacks on MD5 and SHA-1, check [18]).
Later on the first theoretical vulnerabilities, big companies stopped supporting digital
certificates with SHA-1, and started supporting its new and strengthened version, first
launched in 2001, and was and is commonly called SHA-2. SHA-2 is actually a group of
two different algorithms: SHA-256 and SHA-512, which differ on the sizes of the words,
32 bits and 64 bits respectively, and also on the length of the digests, which are 256
bits and 512 bits long, respectively. (There are also SHA-224 and SHA-384, which are
respectively SHA-256 and SHA-512 with truncated digests, and SHA-512/224 and SHA-
512/256, which are basically SHA-512 with digests truncated to 224 bits and 256 bits
respectively)
Even though there were some theoretical reports of length extension attack ([19]) on a
weakened version of SHA-2 (a version with less rounds performed), it is still the most
used cryptographic hash function nowadays, and still there are no concrete evidences that
could make it fall into disuse.
The newest member of the SHA family, SHA-3, does not have much to do with its
older siblings, in terms of architecture of the algorithm itself. It emerged from a NIST
hash function competition, where the Keccak algorithm came up as winner, and was then
published as the SHA-3 Standard in 2015 (it is worth mentioning that SHA-3, as well as
SHA-2, is able to generate digests in different lengths too, such as 224, 256, 384 and 512
bits). Currently, since it does not have any vulnerabilities reported yet, it is the most




Even sharing the same properties as cryptographic hash functions, algorithms used for
password hashing still need some more special requirements. Basically, this subsection
will tell what is needed in order to store passwords in a safer way, in case of Authentication
mechanisms that indeed use passwords (which will be addressed in the next chapter).
As you can imagine, password hashing is the last security measure — or the last se-
curity layer — available. Some people even tend to classify it as a containment measure.
Such things are said because, if some malicious party was able to overcome all the other
security mechanisms, or even if there was a leakage and the database holding users’ infor-
mation became accessible by anyone, the only thing that will be between the passwords
themselves and a malicious adversary is password hashing.
As said before, those three properties from cryptographic hash functions are still
needed in password hashing, but, besides that, when hashing a password, there are some
other features that need to be present and steps that should be followed, in order to be
immune to certain attacks ([20]):
• An algorithm for password hashing needs to be slow, that is, computationally
expensive. It might look a little confusing at first, even because ordinary hash
functions in theory should to be easy to calculate, but in this case it is a little
different. Computers nowadays have processing power to calculate billions of hashes
in a minute. Therefore, in order to compromise the feasibility of attacks such as
the Brute Force (which is an attack where many combinations are tried as inputs
of the hash function in use, until the output matches with the desired hash value),
this property needs to be satisfied.
• It is important to append a random string to the password before hashing and
storing it in the database. This random string, which should be generated per
password, is commonly called "Salt", and it is often stored in plain text along with
the hashed password (which had the salt appended before being hashed). This step
prevents some attacks, such as the Rainbow Table (an attack where the adversary
has a table with pre-computed hash values of many common passwords, to see if
some of his hash values match with any other inside the leaked or invaded passwords
database).
Note: More about these above mentioned and other attacks can be checked in the
section 4.4 (Evaluation Based On Attack Models).
The technique used to slow down existing hash algorithms is called key-stretching.
Some popular examples of key-stretching algorithms are Password-Based Key Derivation
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Function 2 (PBKDF2), scrypt and bcrypt, being PBKDF2 the most widely used. Techni-
cally, bcrypt is not only a key-stretching algorithm itself, it is indeed a hash function made
for password hashing, with parameters to make the computing more expansive (by setting
an iteration count) and to receive a salt, but the community use to reference these three
algorithms together. Other than bcrypt, PBKDF2 and scrypt are purely key-stretching
algorithms; these functions basically receive, as parameters, the hash function (which
may be one the mentioned above, like SHA-512, for instance), the input data for the
hash function — that is, the password —, the salt that will be appended to the password
before the operation, and, last but not least, the iteration count, which basically tells
how many times this function will repeat the hash execution (of course, the larger this
iteration count is, the slower will be the calculation of the final hash value).
Having all this said, it is possible to conclude that, for password hashing, which will
be the case when implementing Authentication in AngraDB Core, a good combination
would be SHA-512 or SHA-3 along with PBKDF2 or scrypt, having a different salt per
password and also good values set for the iteration count (some value that can really slow
down the calculation of the final hash value).
3.3 Public Key Cryptography, Digital Certificates and
Public Key Infrastructure
Digital certificates are essential for some matters, such as Transport Layer Security or
certificate-based authentication, which are two important topics of this work. However,
to first understand digital certificates, it is relevant to have a background on Public-Key
Cryptography, since it is basically what powers digital certificates, and also indicates what
these certificates are for. Furthermore, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) will be presented,
in order to explain and reinforce the reliability of these certificates.
3.3.1 Public Key Cryptography
As introduced in the beginning of this chapter, public key cryptography — or asymmetric-
key cryptography — is basically a system in which the key that is used to encrypt infor-
mation (or validate signatures), the public key, is different from the key that will be used
for the decryption (or to digitally sign), the private key (see Figure 3.3). Even though
these keys are different from each other, they are mathematically related, and one key
cannot be forged using the other, i.e., it is infeasible to forge the private key using the
public key. ([7], [21], [12])
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Figure 3.3: Illustration of a public key encryption scheme (image taken from IBM Knowl-
edge Base).
The public key, as the name suggests, is publicly available — it can be held in a public
repository, for example —, while the private key is only accessed by its owner. This
fact is important because it simplifies a lot the key exchange process, which is needed in
symmetric-key cryptography.
This feature makes public key cryptography suitable for confidentiality or privacy.
However, public key cryptography alone does not work for authentication, because, since
one of the keys is public, anyone can make use of it, indistinguishably.
Talking about its disadvantages, the one that stands out the most is the fact that public
key cryptography algorithms use to be much slower when compared to the symmetric-
key ones. Given this point, when the objective is to encrypt bulky data, public key
cryptography is used just for the exchange of the symmetric keys, which then take care
of the encryption of the voluminous data itself. This exact process happens, for example,
in the SSL/TLS protocol.
Even though encryption is a common use case of public key cryptography, another
common application of it is called digital signature, which is a cryptographic process that
guarantees the property of non-repudiation — the assurance that someone cannot deny
the validity of something (for example, if someone manually signs a contract, he/she
cannot deny it in the future, since its signature would prove it wrong)([22]).
Digital signature describes a process where someone signs some data with his/her
private key, and this signature can then be verified by anyone by using the public key. In
other words, the logic of digital signatures is basically the reverse process of public key
encryption (as it is with RSA, for instance): instead of encrypting the information with
the public key and decrypting it with the private key, it is actually encrypted (signed)
with the private key and decrypted (verified) with the public key. Digital signatures can
then be used like real world signatures, and thus can be really useful to many applications,
such as electronic commerce.
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The four public key algorithms that can be listed as the most popular ones are ([23],
[24], [25], [26]):
• Rivest-Shamir-Adleman (RSA) — the most popular public key algorithm, which is
based on the problem of factoring. It can be used for both data encryption and
digital signatures;
• Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) — based on elliptic curves,
instead of factoring (RSA) or logarithm functions (Diffie-Hellman). Because of
that, it can reach similar security strength with shorter keys, compared to RSA and
Diffie-Hellman;
• Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange — not exactly an algorithm for encryption and de-
cryption, but, as the name suggests, it is intended for the exchange of symmetric
keys in an insecure communication channel;
• Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA)/Digital Signature Standard (DSS) — developed
by Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA), this algorithm is optimized for digital sig-
natures, even though some of its implementations allow encryption and decryption.
Note: For details about these algorithms mentioned above and possible attacks that
can be performed on them, see [7], [21], [12], [8].
3.3.2 Digital Certificates and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
Now that public key encryption has already been introduced, we can move forward to
the definition of digital certificates and public key infrastructure. Digital certificates are
basically documents that associate a specific entity — which may be a person, a server,
a company, and so on — with a public key ([27], [28]).
The format of digital certificates that is most widely used nowadays is x.509 (RFC
5280). This standard defines some fields such as ([29]):
• X.509 version;
• Serial number of the certificate;
• Algorithm that the issuer used to sign this certificate;
• Issuer name — name of the entity that issued this certificate, which use to be a
Certificate Authority (CA);
• Validity period (from when it starts to when it ends);
• Subject name — name of the entity that owns this certificate;
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• Subject public key information — both the public key itself and the public key
algorithm;
• Some other optional fields, such as Issuer Unique Identifier (only available in X.509
v2), Subject Unique Identifier (only available in X.509 v2) and the Extensions (only
available in X.509 v3).
As well as real life official documents, such as passports, driver licenses and official
IDs, have their legitimacy and validity based on the fact that they were issued by a
publicly known and trusted authority (government institutions, for instance) — which
can be verified by some specific watermark, signature or special stamp on the document
—, so do digital certificates. To be more specific, the digital certificates legitimacy and
validity are given by public key infrastructure and public key encryption (by the usage of
digital signatures).
As just stated, digital certificates work very much like those official documents. These
certificates are issued (usually under payment) by the so called Certificate Authorities
(CAs), which bind the identity of a user or system to a public key, with a digital sig-
nature ([30]). These CAs themselves are entities that, as well, own certificates that are
issued and signed by other Certificate Authorities. This chain continues until reaching
the root Certificate Authority, which has a self-signed certificate, and should be trusted
and, preferably, publicly known and accepted.
Having this said, in order to check whether a certificate is valid — and has not been
forged, for example —, all this chain of CAs is traversed, verifying the validity and
the signature (by using their respective public keys) of every certificate, until reaching
the trusted root CA and checking its signature as well (see Figure 3.4). Moreover, the
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) of each Certificate Authority in the chain is also verified,
in order to see if any of the certificates has been revoked.
Finally, Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) can be described as a set of components that,
together, can make the whole architecture of digital certificates work. The following list
shows the components that form a PKI ([30]):
• Certificate Authority (CA)— issues certificates and publishes Certificate Revocation
Lists (CRLs);
• Registration Authority (RA) — works as an interface between the user and the CA,
by authenticating the user and sending the certificate request to the CA;
• Certificate Repository — a place to stow certificates, keys and CRLs, and make
them available;
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Figure 3.4: Diagrams with little explanations about some cases of Certificate Chain Val-
idation. (Images taken from IBM Knowledge Center).
• Security Policy — security specifications, such as the verification process of the
certificates, how CAs will work, how keys will be generated and so on;
• Applications that make use of digital certificates — for example, electronic com-
merce, digital banking, cryptographic protocols such as Secure Socket Layer (SSL),
digitally signing files, and so on.
Digital certificates and Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) can together achieve three
security properties: integrity, non-repudiation and authentication. As observed
before, public key cryptography alone could achieve only the first two security functions,




The Security Architecture of
AngraDB
In this chapter, it will be seen in details what exactly was missing in terms of security
in the project AngraDB, everything that was thought in order to fill these blanks, and
how they were designed to do so. In other words, in this chapter, it will be presented the
security requirements that were needed in AngraDB, and it will also be explained, in a
top level perspective, the solution for these requirements, which are basically the reason
of all this work. Finally, some attack models will be proposed and discussed, in order to
evaluate, in a subjective way, the new AngraDB security design.
First, it is necessary to understand the situation that AngraDB was in. As men-
tioned a few times before, in regards to security concerns, there was nothing thought nor
implemented yet.
The following metaphor can be useful to help you understand part of the security
context of AngraDB: imagine a company that is intended to hold people’s belongings,
however, this place where the company stores all the objects does not have any walls,
fences, nor security crew, nothing! A place like this can be easily rigged by any malicious
party in many different ways: the storage, in the best scenario, can simply be snooped,
but it can also be stolen, or even sabotaged. That same way was AngraDB. Duo to the
lack of security mechanisms, anyone could connect to an AngraDB server and manipulate
anything as wanted, from reading documents in a database to deleting whole databases.
The other part that was missing in this metaphor is the fact that AngraDB also did
not use any protocols to protect the communication channel — which is the TCP/IP
scheme, in our case — until then.
Now that the overview on what was missing in terms of security has just been shown,
it is now possible to talk about each security requirement of AngraDB individually — au-
thentication, authorization and transport layer security —, conceptualizing and detailing
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each of them, besides showing and comparing the way other great database management
systems, such as MongoDB and CouchDB, fulfilled these same necessities in security, and,
lastly, discussing attack models that can be applied to these security subjects.
Before diving into each requirement, it is also very important to remember that An-
graDB is a project that has a huge focus on flexibility, and this means that, more than
simply implanting these security requirements, they need to be designed carefully, so
that other security modules, such as another authentication module, can be attached to
AngraDB and used with ease.
4.1 Authentication
4.1.1 The Requirement
It is very common to see people confusing the concepts of authentication and authoriza-
tion, so, first, let us make them clear once and for all. While authorization regards to
what actions an user can or can not take inside an application (more on this later, in the
authorization section), authentication takes care of identifying uniquely each user that
accesses this very application.
Identifying uniquely a user is important because, once the application now knows
who the client currently connected is, it is now possible, for example, to audit every
action of this user, or even manage his/her permissions upon the application (his/her
authorization).
This second example is crucial, because we have just established that, for authoriza-
tion to exist, it is first necessary that an authentication scheme exists. In other words,
in order to be able to set and manage someone’s permissions in some application, this
application first needs to label this client as an unique user, so that this very user can
have his accesses managed. The project AngraDB, as well as many other applications,
being databases or not, has the same need of an authentication scheme in order to be
able to establish later an authorization mechanism, and hence, keep control of the actions
of each user, which is actually the whole point of authentication and authorization when
combined.
It is worth mentioning that, in order to exemplify the flexibility of AngraDB’s security
interface, the authentication requirement will be contemplated with two mechanisms,




When building an authentication scheme, there are some options of authentication mecha-
nisms to choose, but two of them are the most known: challenge-response mechanism
and authentication with digital certificates. Even though there are many variations
of these mechanisms, these two can still be considered the most used top level designs
when the subject is "authentication".
The challenge-response mechanism is by far the most popular. As the name suggests,
it refers to an authentication system that, in order to be successfully authenticated, the
user will have to answer a specific question correctly, that is, he/she will have to give the
correct response when presented with a challenge by the application (see Figure 4.1).
Usually, this challenge is simply a password, which the user has to send along with his/her
username or any other unique identifier that is established by the application.
Figure 4.1: Simple challenge-response based authentication (image taken from http://
www.defenceindepth.net/2011/04/attacking-lmntlmv1-challengeresponse.html).
This mechanism is used on both Apache CouchDB and MongoDB (which can also be
configured to use authentication based on digital certificates), even though they differ a
little bit on some setups of this mechanism and on some pieces of its architecture.
Authentication with digital certificates also could not be more straight forward. Basi-
cally, to identify uniquely the users securely, this authentication mechanism counts on the
the reliability of digital certificates given by a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), formed
by publicly known and trusted Certificate Authorities (CAs). Usually, all an user needs
to do to get authenticated using this method is present his/her digital certificate and its
private key, which may either be inside a file or not (on Figure 4.2, it is possible to see a
good and common example of certificate-based authentication).
4.1.3 Challenge-Response Authentication
Now that the core concept of the challenge-response mechanism has already been pre-
sented, we can approach some deeper details about, for example, how the architecture of
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Figure 4.2: Basic example of a digital certificate-based authentication scheme
(image taken from https://docs.oracle.com/cd/E19575-01/820-2765/6nebir7eb/
index.html).
a scheme of this kind is formed. Furthermore, once shown the details of this authenti-
cation scheme, we will also present some comparisons between the ways MongoDB and
CouchDB use challenge-response in authentication.
Even showing the details, this mechanism still looks very simple. A more thorough
step-by-step about how an authentication scheme of this kind works would look like this:
1. Client requests authentication to the server;
2. Server sends the challenge to the client. Observation: In some cases, step 2 and
step 3 may be encompassed in step 1, which would then become: Client requests
authentication to the server, sending his credentials as well;
3. Client sends the response back to the server;
4. Server checks whether the client’s response matches to the password that is stored
in the authentication database for this user (if the user even exists);
• Usually, before being stored in the authentication database and also before
being checked in this very database, the password may pass through a cryp-
tographic hash function, in order to make the process of obtaining someone’s
password more difficult, in case this authentication database is leaked or in-
vaded;
• Furthermore, some real world applications even append a "salt", which is a
pseudo-random string of data, to the passwords before hashing them. This
step is also to avoid some attacks on a leaked or invaded passwords database
(more on these attacks later, in the Attack Models chapter).
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5. If the response given by the client matches with the one that was previously stored
in the authentication database, the server changes the status of this user to "authen-
ticated" and tells the client that the authentication process occurred successfully.
Otherwise, in case this user did not even exist in the database yet, or if the client’s
response did not match, the "not authenticated" status is maintained, and the server
sends a message back to the client, saying that the authentication process failed.
These steps above are reproduced in a great part of authentication schemes that are
based in the challenge-response mechanism. However, each application may differ a little
bit in some of aspects, but basically, some of the main differences between them lies in how
the password is hashed before getting stored in the database — that is, what algorithm(s)
is(are) used for password hashing — and how the authentication information of the users
is stored.
MongoDB’s and Apache CouchDB’s Challenge-Response Mechanisms
As just said, the main difference between the Authentication architectures of these DBMSs
lie in the way users’ authentication information is dealt with and stored, and also how
the users’ passwords are manipulated and hashed before going to the database.
Regarding to the first point, MongoDB’s way to store authentication information
might seem a little confusing at first sight. In its documentation, it is stated that, when
a user is created in a specific database, this will be its Authentication Database. Some
people may think that, hence, this user’s authentication information will be stowed there,
but, actually, all the authentication data is stored centrally, in a collection (system.users)
inside admin database. So, the real function of the Authentication Database is serve,
along with the username, as a unique identifier for a user — which means that users with
the same username can be created in different databases, since its identity is given by
the username and its authentication database together. CouchDB’s way to deal with
authentication data looks simpler because it just uses the username as unique identifier,
as it is normally done, and store all the user’s authentication information in a central
authentication database as well.
In regard to how these DBMSs use to manipulate and hash the passwords when using
the Challenge-Response mechanism for Authentication, MongoDB uses what they call
Salted Challenge Response Authentication Mechanism (SCRAM), which is based on RFC
5082, the stardard that defines best-practices on challenge-response mechanisms, and
CouchDB goes with PBKDF2, which is rather based on RFC 2898.
Even though the names are different, in practice, they offer almost the same: the Mon-
goDB’s SCRAM features different random salt per user and an adjustable iteration count,
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as well as CouchDB does while using PBKDF2. Thus, the differences lie basically on the
fact that MongoDB’s SCRAM performs a mutual authentication (server to the client and
client to the server), while that does not happen with CouchDB’s mechanism (which is
only one-way authentication: client to server), and also on the fact that PBKDF2 is much
more liberal on the hash function — it actually expects pseudo-random functions as pa-
rameter, which is a much broader concept — comparing to SCRAM, which only accepts
SHA-1 and SHA-256 as hash functions. Although it was not clear in their documentation,
CouchDB apparently uses SHA-1 as the hash function inside PBKDF2.
Note: For more information about how the authentication mechanisms of MongoDB
and CouchDB work, please check [31] and [32], respectively.
AngraDB’s Challenge-Response Mechanism
We decided to follow Apache CouchDB’s way to deal with authentication data because of
its general simplicity, and, thus, we chose to use only the username as unique identifier,
and store all the users’ information in a centralized authentication database.
Now, in regards to the way the password is hashed before being manipulated in the
authentication database, we have only followed CouchDB until a certain point. PBKDF2
was the chosen algorithm for key-stretching both because of CouchDB and also — and
mostly — because of its popularity among the community when the matter is password
hashing.
However, Apache CouchDB does not enter much in details about the parameters used
in PBKDF2, and thus, our decisions regarding to this are all based in a mix of researches
and testing indeed different parameters on AngraDB Core. The following list discuss the
decisions took for the PBKDF2 parameters:
• hash function — the hash algorithm that was chosen to be used inside PBKDF2
was SHA-512, since, as discussed in the Cyptographic Hash Functions section of the
previous chapter, it is a mature and widely used hash function, besides not having
still any concrete vulnerabilities. Moreover, it is commonly used by the community
along with PBKDF2.
• salt — while MongoDB does not specify in its documentation how it generates
each salt per user, CouchDB uses 128-bit UUIDs (Universally unique identifiers) as
salts. Well, the salt needs be long enough so that it does not repeat itself between
users, and thus prevent Rainbow Table attacks, but even if it repeats once, still it
should not be a major security concern. RFC 2898, which is the PBKDF2 standard,
suggests a minimum salt length of 64 bits, and the community tend to suggest 128-
bit salts. Having this is mind, AngraDB opted to generate random salts formed by
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22 alphanumeric characters (for sake of simplicity in implementation), which gives
a number of possibilities similar to a 128-bit random salt (6222 ∼ 2128).
• iteration count — as explained before, this number dictates how many times the
hash function will be executed until the final hash value is found. Its objective is to
slow down its calcultion, to prevent Brute Force attacks. To obtain a value for the
iteration count for AngraDB, some different values were tested, and the duration
of authentication process for each value were compared. Without further ado, the
chosen number for the iteration count was 150,000. While testing and timing some
log in attempts, it took around 1.92s±0.05s for the PBKDF2 algorithm to calculate
each final digest with these parameters. (Disclaimer: The computer used to run this
test had an i5-6600K processor and a nVidia GTX 970 video card, and was running
Ubuntu 64-bits in a virtual machine with 8GB of RAM available)
The Figure 4.3 summarizes these top-level decisions about how AngraDB’s challenge-
response mechanism stows user’s information and how it hashes users’s passwords.
Figure 4.3: A summary/example of AngraDB’s challenge-response authentication mech-
anism. In this picture, the password field is the hexadecimal result of an execution of
PBKDF2. The input was a concatenation of the password "Password!123" and the salt
present on the image, which has 22 alphanumeric characters. PBKDF2 was run with the




Note: Before reading this subsection, it is important that you first have a background
on Transport Layer Security and on its handshake. This subject is approached in section
4.3, which is a section that is reserved entirely for this matter.
Even though authentication with digital certificates may seem to be complicated, it
is actually quite simple. Its simplicity comes from the fact that the SSL/TLS handshake
takes care of the authentication process itself — and that is why it is good to have a
background on this matter first.
In the beginning of the SSL/TLS handshake, the server, while sending its certificate,
may also require the client to send his/her certificate as well — which is a process called
mutual SSL authentication, or two-way SSL authentication. By doing that, not only the
server authenticates to the client, but the client needs to authenticate to the server as
well.
As observed in Figure 4.2 and as detailed in subsection 4.3.2, in course of the SSL/TLS
handshake, after the client sends its certificate and the evidence (a random byte string
that is unique to this current handshake, and is known by both client and sever), which is
to be encrypted with the client’s private key, the authentication of the client will happen
in two steps: the validation of the client’s certificate itself, and the verification of the
evidence, which will be performed using the client’s public key.
The first step is done by verifying the certificate’s expiration date and by performing
the Certificate Chain Validation, which is a process that checks the digital signature
present on the certificate using the public key of the CA that issued it. This process is
repeated with the certificate of the CA and the other CA that issued it as well and so
on, until reaching the root CA, which should be public known and trusted — or at least
trusted by the party that is performing the Certificate Chain Validation (see Figure 3.4).
In some cases, the Certificate Revocation List (CRL) of each CA is also verified, to make
sure that these certificates were not revoked in this mean time.
The second step is intended to confirm if the client is indeed the owner of the certificate,
after all, the client can just be pretending to be the owner, when presenting this very
certificate. As it allegedly encrypted the evidence with its private key, then it should be
possible to decrypt and verify the evidence using the public key found in the certificate
(which was already validated in the first step). If the verification of the evidence is
successful, it means that the client indeed has the pair of keys, which then means that
he/she is indeed the owner of the certificate, since it should be infeasible to forge a private
key for the public key that is on the certificate.
29
AngraDB’s Certificate-Based Authentication Mechanism
Once the SSL/TLS handshake has already finished and guaranteed the client authenti-
cation, all an application that already has support for SSL/TLS needs to do is stow the
desired authentication information in its authentication database, for example, the user
name, the client’s certificate itself, and extra data, such as the user’s address, and other
things that the application may find necessary. Therefore, in future authentications of
this very user, the only thing to do is retrieve the user’s register from the authentication
database.
That was the exact approach of AngraDB in its certificate-based authentication mech-
anism. In this scheme, the only user information that is stored is the user name and the its
certificate, which was used in its authentication. This information is stowed in the same
way as it is with AngraDB’s Challenge-Response mechanism, represented in Figure 4.3:
there is a document in the authentication database for each user, and all the information
is put there. However, as just stated, instead of the password and salt, the user name and
the certificate are the data to be stored.
Note: In this subsection, it will not be presented how MongoDB and CouchDB
designs the solution for Certificate-Based Authentication, since CouchDB does not even
has support for this, and MongoDB does not go much in details about its architecture for
this mechanism. Instead, it just explains how to authenticate with x509 certificates.
4.2 Authorization
4.2.1 The Requirement
As previously stated, it was first necessary to have established who is who inside the
application, that is, it is necessary to have users identified uniquely, in order to, then, be
able to specify what some user can or cannot do. Once Authentication is clarified, we are
now able to get into Authorization.
Authorization, which is often called Access Control, plays a very important role in
security: it takes care of controlling what actions an user can perform upon determined
resources. It is crucial because, without Authorization, an application turns into chaos:
either everything or nothing is permitted — being the first option more common in an
application without an authorization scheme.
Going straight to the point, now that AngraDB already resolved Authentication, it
then needs a mechanism that can discriminate each user, restricting their actions upon
resources inside AngraDB. This mechanism should also permit the manipulation of the
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accesses of each user. For sake of completeness, it should satisfy these following properties,
as stated by [33]:
• "Prevent access — in the absence of any privilege, ensure that the subject cannot
access the object. The principle of Failsafe Defaults says that this should be the
default.
• Determine access — decide whether a subject has access, according to some policy,
to take an action with an object.
• Grant access — give a subject access to an object. The principle of Separation of
Privilege says this should be fine-grained; don’t grant access to many objects just
to enable access to one.
• Revoke access — remove a subject’s access to an object.
• Audit access — Determine which subjects can access an object, or which objects a
subject can access."
4.2.2 Access Control Models
In order to guarantee those points above mentioned, achieving that by establishing con-
cepts and relations between subjects (the user, or process), objects (the resource itself,
like a table or a collection) and operations (such as read and write), there are some mod-
els that can be used as base for the implementation of the desired Authorization scheme.
These are some of the many and many existing Access Control Models:
1. Discretionary Access Control (DAC);
2. Role-Based Access Control (RBAC);
3. Mandatory Access Control (MAC);
4. Attribute-based Access Control (ABAC);
5. Rule-Based Access Control (RAC).
Because there are lots of different models, only the first two will be approached in this
work: Discretionary Access Control (DAC) and Role-Based Access Control (RBAC).
Discretionary Access Control (DAC)
The Discretionary Access Control model ([4], [33], [34]), among those three mentioned,
is probably the simplest one, and also one of the most widely used as well. When using
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this model, the owners of resources can tell what permissions or what operations can be
performed by each specific user upon each specific resource.
This information, which correlates the resources and the subjects, telling what op-
erations they can perform, can be represented by the so called access control matrix,
introduced by Lampson in 1974. An example of this very matrix can be observed in
Figure 4.4.
Figure 4.4: Example of a simple access control matrix. Inside the cells, "W" are equivalent
to "Write" operation, and "R" to "Read" operation. As said before, the absence of privilege
— that is, empty cell — means no access at all. (Table taken from [4]).
Even though this table is good to visualize all the access information, applications
do not use to implement it as it is. There are actually two common ways to store this
information: either by rows or by columns.
The first one is normally called privileges list or capabilities list, and it basically shows
which permissions a determined subject has upon some resources. Taking the Fig-
ure 4.4 for example, it would be something like: David — read access upon Medical
Record and Administrative Record.
The second one though, which is the most popular, is called access control list (ACL). It
organizes the permissions of subjects per resource. For instance, having the Figure 4.4
as example again: Medical Record — Alice and Charly can perform Read and Write
operations, and David can only perform Read ones.
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC)
“A role is a job function or job title within the organization with some associated semantics
regarding the authority and responsibility conferred on a member of the role” — Sandhu,
Coyne, Feinstein, and Youman (1996) ([4]).
Role-Based Access Control model ([35], [4], [34]) organizes accesses based on roles
that groups of subjects play in some organization, or, in our case, in the application. In
other words, when using RBAC, the permissions are not given to the subjects directly, as
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it is with Discretionary Access Control; instead, they are given to roles, which are then
associated to the subjects. In this case, each user — or subject — will have permissions
according to the role associated to him/her, as observed in Figure 4.5.
Figure 4.5: Illustration of a simple Role-Based Access Control (RBAC) model.
Even though this feature may not be present in every application that uses authoriza-
tion based on roles, RBAC specifies that roles are hierarchical, which means that a
role should be able to inherit from another role, earning, hence, all the permissions from
its parent.
It is worth mentioning that, regardless of the chosen authorization scheme, the ap-
plication that utilizes it should follow the Principle of Least Privilege (PoLP), which is
a concept that says that an user should only have the necessary permissions to perform
his/her intended actions ([35]).
4.2.3 MongoDB’s and CouchDB’s Access Control Systems
Both of these Database Management Systems use the Role-Based Access Control model.
However, the Apache CouchDB’s implementation and usage is much more basic than
MongoDB’s, which is more robust and thorough.
CouchDB’s Access Control System
CouchDB’s authorization scheme is actually quite lean. It comes only with two built-in
classes (which are applied in database-level): member and admin. Users that are members
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can read, edit and create documents inside the database, except the ones they call design
documents. Admins, thus, are able to create, read and modify any type of document,
besides configuring other users’ roles and the database itself.
Note: It is important to make explicit that there are two kinds of admins in CouchDB:
the database-level admins and the server-level admins.
Besides that, custom roles can be created by an admin. At first, it might look strange
that these roles can only be assigned to those two classes that were just presented. What
if someone wanted to create a role that has just read-only permission, or anything that
is more customized than what "member" and "admin" classes can offer? Well, there is
nothing built-in that facilitates this process. Instead, it is only possible by implementing
authorization functions that are run before each user action. These functions will tell
whether the user, based on his roles, will be able or not to take his/her desired action.
MongoDB’s Access Control System
On the other hand, MongoDB has everything already built-in. As specified in its docu-
mentation, MongoDB treats roles as a group of privileges, being each privilege composed
by a resource and the permitted operations upon this resource ("operations" are referred
to as "actions" in MongoDB’s documentation).
Dealing with roles in MongoDB really looks very straightforward. For starters, it
already comes with a wide variety of built-in roles, which are split in a few categories:
• Database User Roles — regular roles with privileges that apply to single databases:
read and readWrite;
• Database Administration Roles — administration roles with privileges that apply
to single databases: dbAdmin, dbOwner and userAdmin;
• All-Database Roles — roles with privileges that apply to all databases (except for
the ones they call the local and config databases): readAnyDatabase, readWriteAny-
Database, userAdminAnyDatabase and dbAdminAnyDatabase;
• Superuser Roles — this role provides full privileges to all databases: root;
• There are also Cluster Administration Roles, Backup and Restoration Roles and
Internal Roles.
To create new custom roles in MongoDB is quite trivial as well. Given the fact
that roles are a group of privileges, and that each privilege is made of a resource and
its permitted actions, all that is needed in order to create a new role is compose it
with your desired privileges. As "resource", clusters, full databases or collections inside
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a database can be chosen. For the actions, MongoDB has a list of operations grouped
by common purpose, and you can choose whichever actions you want to compose your
desired privileges.
It is important to mention that roles in MongoDB are hierarchical! Hence, if specified
that a role inherits from another role, this very role will keep all privileges from its parent,
as explained before.
4.2.4 AngraDB’s Access Control System
Even though we have been using MongoDB and Apache CouchDB as parameter to build
our needed security requirements’ architectures, it will not be the case with Authorization.
As one of the biggest challenges with this work was actually designing and building
the generic interfaces themselves so that people could later attach other security modules
according to their will, we opted for the simple, regarding to the architecture of the
Authorization mechanism itself.
Instead of opting for Role-Based Access Control (RBAC), as MongoDB and CouchDB
did, the access control model that was chosen for AngraDB in this work was Discretionary
Access Control (DAC), which is also a very popular model, as discussed before.
In relation to the storage of authorization information, it is done in the access control
list (ACL) format: there is a document inside the authorization database for each database
in AngraDB, and, inside this document, there is a list of users and their permissions upon
this database that this document is associated to.
In AngraDB’s DAC, there are four possible permissions to be chosen, which are applied
in database level, that is, these permissions are valid for a database and all resources
available inside it. Check the list of permissions:
0. NoPermission — As the name suggests, if a subject has this permission assigned to
him in a database (or if the subject has no authorization information at all), then
he/she has no access to this database;
1. ReadPermission — Subjects with this permission can perform read operations, such
as look-ups and query terms on documents inside this database;
2. ReadAndWritePermission — Subjects with this permission are able to execute read
and also write operations, including the creation of new documents, and edition and
deletion of existing documents inside the database;
3. OwnerPermission — This permission allows a subject to do everything the other
permissions already do, and also enables a subject to delete the database and ma-
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nipulate other users’ permissions inside this very database as well, by editing or
granting some permission, or even listing all of them.
It was possible to observe that these permissions work like concentric circles: from a
permission to a higher one, the higher one is able to do everything the other can, and
is also able to perform some more actions. This is done like this because, when these
permissions are stored in the Authorization database, they are stowed as integers (the
same integers that can be noted in the list above). That way, when a permission for
certain operation is requested, its number is compared to the one in the database, related
to the subject; if the subject’s number is equal or greater, then the access is allowed, and,
otherwise, denied. An overview on how this authorization information is stored can be
checked on Figure 4.6.
Before the execution of every subject’s action, the permission needed for this operation
is verified, using the process that was mentioned above to decide whether the action can
be taken or not. It is important to mention that some operations inside AngraDB do
not need any permission to be performed (actually, they require, as minimum permission,
"NoPermission", which is the same as saying that it does not require any permission),
such as registering, logging in and out, and creating new databases (of which you will
receive "OwnerPermission" when doing so).
Figure 4.6: Illustration of the storage architecture of AngraDB’s authorization scheme.
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4.3 Transport Layer Security
4.3.1 The Requirement
We have stated that Authorization needs Authentication to work, but there is still a
problem in this scenario. With what was discussed until this point, the operations inside
the application are more restrictive, since we already have an Authorization system that
is working along with an Authentication mechanism (or mechanisms). The problem is
that, in order to be able to access the application and perform the desired actions, it is
first necessary to send sensitive information — the user’s credentials — to the server at
the time of authentication.
As explained before, AngraDB uses Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) to commu-
nicate externally, and given the fact that there were no security mechanisms protecting
the communication medium, it is possible to easily capture all the packets that are traded
between the server and the client and see all the information that is being traded in plain-
text, using, for example, some network traffic analyzer, such as Wireshark or tcpdump,
as can be observed in Figure 4.7.
Figure 4.7: Screen-shot of packets that were captured using tcpdump in Ubuntu, right after
a log in attempt in AngraDB. As it is possible to see, the user’s credentials can be easily
noted in the payload of the packet (user name: user_A, and password: Password!123 ) .
Having this said, AngraDB needs a way of ensuring secrecy when communicating
externally, that is, a way to trade information in an encrypted channel, making it infeasible
for eavesdroppers to reach and tamper the actual content that is being traded.
To fulfill this blank, there is a protocol whose name is very self explanatory, even
though not so creative: the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol, successor of the
deprecated Secure Socket Layer (SSL) protocol.
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4.3.2 The SSL/TLS Protocol
SSL/TLS emerged exactly from the necessity of creating an encrypted communication
channel that could be secure and have secrecy, preventing adversaries from eavesdropping
and tampering its content.
As a historical background ([36]), Secure Socket Layer (SSL) was developed by Netscape,
but its first version was never published publicly. Its version 2.0 was published in 1995,
but it was quickly replaced by version 3.0 in 1996, since a variety of vulnerabilities were
being discovered and exposed. Transport Layer Security (TLS) is basically another ver-
sion upgrade of SSL, since it is practically SSL v3.0 with some improvements and fixes on
some other vulnerabilities. Is short, both SSL and TLS refer to the same protocol itself,
being TLS essentially SSL v4.0, but with a different name, even though a great part of
the community still calls it SSL.
SSL/TLS is a protocol that operates above the transport layer, and is a clear example
of both public-key encryption and symmetric-key encryption. It basically establishes a
handshake whose objective is to, first, confirm the identity of one or both parties (e.g. a
client, which may be a browser, and a server), and then share information about how the
channel will be encrypted from then on — this information is essentially the encryption
key and the encryption scheme that will be used ([37], [38], [36]).
Here is an overview on the SSL/TLS handshake (which was built gathering information
from [39], [40], [41], [38] and [37]):
1. Client sends a Client Hello message, with his/her SSL/TLS version, the cipher
suites that are supported by the client (sorted according to client’s preference) and
a random byte string that will be used in subsequent computations, which we will
call client_random;
2. Server first verifies the client’s SSL/TLS version, and then sends a Server Hello
message, with the cipher suit that was chosen from the client’s list, the session ID,
another random byte string (server_random), and, most importantly, the Server
Certificate (which contains the server’s public key);
3. OPTIONAL — The server may require the client’s certificate as well. If this is the
case, the server also sends, along with the client’s certificate request, a list with the
supported types of certificate and acceptable Certification Authorities (CAs);
4. The client authenticates the server by validating its certificate, which was just sent
by the server. If the authentication fails, a warning may be emitted or the handshake
may fail. Then, the client generates a pre_master_secret, encrypts it with the
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server’s public key (which was inside the server’s certificate) and sends it back to
the server;
5. OPTIONAL — If the server had previously requested the client’s certificate, then
the client sends, along with what was said to be sent in step 4, his/her certificate and
an encrypted random byte string that is known between both parties (client_random
or server_random, for example), which is encrypted using the client’s private key
so that the server can use it to authenticate back the client with the client’s public
key;
6. OPTIONAL — If the server had previously requested the client’s certificate, then it
authenticates the client by verifying its certificate and by decrypting and verifying
the data that the client sent. If the authentication fails, the handshake fails as well;
7. The server then decrypts the pre_master_secret with its private key (this is an
important part of the server authentication process as well, since the server party
will only be able to decrypt the pre_master_secret if he/she is indeed the owner
of the pair of keys, and hence, the owner of the server certificate). Now that both
the server and the client have the three pieces (client_random, server_random and
pre_master_secret), they both will use them to generate the session key, which
is a symmetric key that will be used to encrypt and verify the integrity of the data
that will be traded between the server and the client along the session.
8. The client tells the server that the incoming messages will be encrypted using the
session key, and also sends an encrypted message saying that the handshake is
finished on the client’s behalf;
9. The server does the same and tells the client that the incoming messages will be
encrypted using the session key as well, and also sends an encrypted message saying
that the handshake is finished on the server’s behalf. The fact that both parties
have received the Finished message, which was encrypted using the session key, is
enough for them to acknowledge that the handshake was successful, and now they
can start exchanging messages securely and with secrecy.
For more technical and detailed information about the Secure Socket Layer (SSL) or
the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocols, check [37].
4.3.3 AngraDB’s Transport Layer Security
Regarding to Transport Layer Security, both MongoDB and Apache CouchDB come with
built-in support for SSL/TLS, and so was done with AngraDB.
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SSL/TLS support was implanted in AngraDB, being now possible to choose between
pure TCP, or TCP with SSL/TLS — using the versions that are supported by the
Erlang SSL application: SSL-3.0, TLS-1.0, TLS-1.1, TLS-1.2, DTLS-1.0 (based on TLS-
1.1), DTLS-1.2 (based on TLS-1.2), by the time this monography was written. If the
second option is chosen (TCP with SSL/TLS), the only necessary thing to do is configure
the AngraDB start-up settings, by setting the server’s certificate information such as the
server’s certificate itself, the certificate key and the Certificate Authority (CA) certificates.
By configuring it as said, AngraDB is now able to listen to incoming SSL/TLS con-
nections, perform the SSL/TLS handshake properly, and, finally, trade messages securely
and with secrecy.
It is worth reinforcing that, if AngraDB is not configured to use SSL/TLS and the
server’s certificate information are not set, it still works like it used to before, listening
to incoming pure TCP connections, executing pure TCP handshakes and exchanging
messages via TCP in plaintext.
As a counterpoint to Figure 4.7, which shows all the content of packets that were
captured after a login attempt in AngraDB in plaintext, including the user’s credentials,
now that AngraDB uses a fully encrypted communication channel, it is now possible to
see, in Figure 4.8, that the packets’ payloads cannot be eavesdropped anymore, since they
are all encrypted.
Figure 4.8: Screen-shot of packets that were captured using tcpdump in Ubuntu, right
after a log in attempt in AngraDB, using SSL/TLS. Now that this protocol is being
used, the content of the packets are encrypted and no longer readable (or, at least, no
longer understandable) as they were in Figure 4.7, which means that the user’s credentials
are now kept in secrecy through the communication channel. (user name: user_B, and
password: Password!123 ) .
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4.4 Evaluation Based On Attack Models
As said in the introduction of this chapter, this section in intended to evaluate — subjec-
tively — the AngraDB security design that was just proposed and discussed throughout
this very chapter, by presenting some attacks and approaches used by attackers that are
popular and commonly performed, and then discussing how this new AngraDB security
design would deal with them.
Note: This section will focus on attacks and flaws on the challenge-response authen-
tication mechanism, since the other features such as the certificate-based authentication
and the transport layer security have their securities based on the Erlang’s implementation
of the TLS protocol — which already uses its most recent version (TLS v1.2).
An attacker who intends to impersonate users’ identities and use their accesses to
perform its malicious actions, needs to bypass the Authentication mechanisms, which are
basically the first line of defense against unauthorized access.
There are some basic and common ways to try to bypass an authentication scheme,
being the most part of them related to flaws on challenge-response authentication mech-
anisms.
The most basic attack would be a simple password guessing, where the attacker, once
having someone’s username, tries some passwords manually. Furthermore, this attack
may also evolve a little bit and turn into a Brute Force or a Dictionary attack.
Brute Force attacks consist of attempts to guess someone’s password by running a
program that tries many different combinations, changing character by character, until
finding the correct password.
Dictionary attacks are similar to Brute Force attacks, but they are more efficient,
since, instead of trying many random combinations, it tries a set of common passwords
(a dictionary of passwords).
Usually, there are three flaws that can make these attacks succeed:
• using verbose messages — when specific messages such as "incorrect password" are
used, the application is giving the attacker sensitive information, since, in the case
of this example, it is basically confirming that the username is valid, making it easier
for the adversary;
• allow to try indefinitely — this permits the attacker to use all its computational
power to try to find the correct password, which may result in millions or even
billions of attempts per minute, with attacks such as the brute force or dictionary;
• using a bad password — using common or simple passwords facilitates attacks such
as dictionary or even simple password-guessing, since they use a list of common
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passwords — a huge list, in case of a dictionary attack — to try to guess the user’s
secret.
In regard to the first point, AngraDB cares about not being not overly verbose. In a
case such as the exemplified, for instance, AngraDB would emit the message "incorrect
username or password".
Even though AngraDB still lets users try to authenticate indeterminate times, it uses
the PBKDF2 key-stretching algorithm to slow down the password hashing, making one
single authentication attempt take about two seconds, which compromises the effective-
ness of attacks that count on repetition (such as the brute force and the dictionary at-
tacks).
Regarding the last point, AngraDB’s challenge-response mechanism does not yet re-
inforce the user’s password quality at the moment of registration, which may let users
utilize bad passwords.
Besides attacking the challenge-response mechanism itself, there could be cases that,
for example, the authentication database is leaked. Unfortunately, leakages happen, but
authentication mechanisms needs to be prepared for that and have containment measures.
The worst possible scenario is an authentication database that saves the user’s pass-
words in plaintext. In these cases, the passwords are already available for untrusted
parties. However, even authentication databases with hashed passwords are susceptible
to attackers.
Password hashing is literally the last security measure between the attacker and the
passwords themselves, so it needs to be robust in order to prevent some specific attacks.
(The discussion about features of a good password hashing scheme can be check on the
Cryptography chapter, in the section 3.2).
In order to overcome the password hashing and get to the passwords, Brute Force and
Dictionary attacks are still used. The difference now is that each attempted combination
needs to be hashed before being compared to other hashes in the leaked database.
Besides these two attacks, there is one called Rainbow Table attack. This one is
more efficient than the other two attacks when the matter is cracking hashed passwords.
Rainbow Table attack is basically a big table of common passwords and their pre-computed
hash values. With this table in hands, attackers can easily check if any of the pre-computed
hash values on the table is present in the leaked database. If the authentication scheme
does not have any plans against such attacks, it is possible that many hash values of the
database match with the hash codes from the table. Once the hackers know which digests
did match, they just need to check, on the table, the correspondent passwords.
42
As explained in the Cryptography chapter (section 3.2), the AngraDB Authentication
system counts on a password hashing scheme that is strong against these three attacks
(brute force, dictionary and rainbow table attacks).
Besides slowing down the calculation of the final digest (which compromises the feasi-
bility of brute force and dictionary attacks), the key-stretching algorithm PBDKF2, used
in AngraDB for password hashing, appends a pseudo-random 22-character alphanumeric
salt to the password before hashing it 150,000 times. By concatenating this salt to the
passwords, the pre-computed hash values on the rainbow table are no longer useful.
Moreover, even appending a salt to the end of each possible password in the table and
recomputing their digests, it would only work for a single password, since the random
salts are generated per user.
Even though this security design has increased AngraDB’s security substantially, it still
has a lot to enhance. For example, AngraDB security system still has no defence against
Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, which are a common class of attack, and it also needs to
get better even in some points of authentication security, as seen in the beginning of this
section, with the reinforcement of the quality of the user’s passwords and with restricting




This chapter is intended to dig a little deeper than the last chapter, and enter the imple-
mentation details. However, besides only detailing a little more the security requirements
that were implemented in this work, this chapter will finally approach the architecture
and implementation of the Security Interface, which was what made this work’s solution
flexible — which is a point that have been mentioned since the beginning of this paper.
5.1 Security Interface
Even though this work had indeed implemented security modules that satisfied the secu-
rity requirements that were mentioned in the last chapter — authentication, authorization
and transport layer security —, one of the focuses of this work lied in developing a flex-
ible interface that could make it easy for anyone to implement and use, in AngraDB,
other security modules that satisfy these very requirements.
The strategy that was adopted to build the interface was the same for both the au-
thentication and authorization requirements: to use the Behaviour Design Pattern (which
was explained in the section 2.2) and create two generic modules that, according to the
Behaviour Design Pattern, are going to be the behaviour modules, and serve as interface
of creation of new authentication or authorization modules, which will be the respective
callback modules.
Important: The expression interface of creation, which will be repeated often, is key
to the Security Interface logic. It comes from the usage of behaviour modules in AngraDB,
which were thought to be exactly an interface that dictates how a new module should be
implemented (created), in order be attached and used in AngraDB.
This strategy, as explained in the second chapter, is very common in Erlang, and even
existed already in AngraDB. As well as Erlang exposes its Generic Server (gen_server)
— which is a behaviour module — to be implemented by other callback modules, An-
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graDB also followed this same strategy for the first time when the Generic Persistence
(gen_persistence) module was exposed in AngraDB’s API. This AngraDB’s first behaviour
module served as an interface for the creation of different kinds of persistence modules,
such as the ones that we have nowadays: adbtree_persistence, hanoidb_persistence and
ets_persistence, which are all callback modules of the gen_persistence behaviour module.
Back again to the Security Interface logic, the Generic Authentication and Generic
Authorization modules — gen_authentication and gen_authorization, respectively —
are going to be used by AngraDB internally. The respective callback modules are
then going to have their functions — callbacks — called inside gen_authentication and
gen_authorization. This way, the callback modules, which are implementations of spe-
cific authentication or authorization mechanisms, will be invisible to AngraDB internally,
since it is only going to deal directly with the generic modules.
A good example of that would be a login operation: AngraDB would call the login
function from gen_authentication module, and, inside this function, gen_authentication
would call the handle_login function, which should be implemented by the authentication
callback module, as specified in gen_authentication’s behaviour_info (the block of code
inside a behaviour module that specifies the functions that should be implemented by
the callback module and also their arities). To make things clearer, check Figure 5.1 and
Figure 5.2.
Figure 5.1: The top of the gen_authentication behaviour module. Note its behaviour_info
and its exported functions.
Once the callback module is implemented, the only two things left to do are: con-
figure the respective setup function inside the Server Supervisor (server_sup) — for ex-
ample, if a new authentication callback module was added, you should configure the
setup_authentication function, adding the new module as a possible option of authenti-
cation —, and put the name of the callback module and its configurations in AngraDB
start-up options (inside the file "adb_core.app") in order to start using it. (Check the files
"adb_core.app" and "server_sup.erl", inside the AngraDB repository, to get the idea a
little better).
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Figure 5.2: The top of the adb_authentication callback module. Note its exported func-
tions.
Summary of the steps needed to add a new security module (either au-
thentication or authorization) to AngraDB and start using it:
• Implement the callback module for either Generic Authentication (gen_authentication)
or Generic Authorization (gen_authorization) behaviour modules;
• Configure the respective setup function (setup_authentication or setup_authorization)
inside the Server Supervisor module (server_sup), in order to add your module as
a possible option of authentication or authorization mechanism;
• Set the name of your callback module and its configuration proplist inside the An-
graDB start-up settings file ("adb_core.app") to start using the new authentication
or authorization module.
5.2 Authentication
Most of the changes that were made in the development of the authentication architecture
are focused in the ADB Server module (adb_server), which, as said in chapter 2, is
the AngraDB module that manages the external communication and uses Transmission
Control Protocol (TCP) to do so.
Each instance of the ADB Server, which will be taking care of a specific connection,
has an internal state that is updated after handling each request. Until then, this state
was being used to store information such as the socket of the current connection, the
persistence module setup and the database that the user is currently connected.
This server state was then chosen to store the authentication information — both the
authentication setup (which is a tuple with the authentication callback module that is
being used and its settings) and also the authentication status of the session (a tuple with
the authentication status itself, like loggedIn or loggedOut, and the user information, such
as the username, in case he/she is already authenticated).
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By having this authentication information available in the server status, it can now
be used to restrict some actions of the user, and so was done.
When the server receives a message, it first parses the whole string to obtain the
command and its arguments. After that, the commands used to be evaluated directly
(within a big switch case that, based on the string of the command, executes a specific
function), but that was the exact part that changed in the implementation of the authen-
tication scheme: the old function that evaluated the commands right after the parsing
(evaluate_request) was split in two new functions — evaluate_authenticated_request and
evaluate_not_authenticated_request. Now, before the evaluation of the command, the
authentication status of the connection is verified and, depending on the status, the func-
tion evaluate_authenticated_request or evaluate_not_authenticated_request will then be
called.
Commands that do not depend on the authentication of the user (such as the login
command) are evaluated inside the function evaluate_not_authenticated_request, and all
the rest is evaluated in evaluate_authenticated_request. This way, if a user that is not
logged in yet send a create_db command, for example, it will be evaluated inside the
evaluate_not_authenticated_request function and, since it is a command that needs the
user to be authenticated, the server will send an error message back to the user.
These two structural changes — the inclusion of the authentication setup and the au-
thentication status in the server state, and the separation of the function evaluate_request
into evaluate_authenticated_request and evaluate_not_authenticated_request —were the
main changes that were made for the common authentication part inside the ADB Server.
Besides those two changes, the authentication commands (login, logout and regis-
ter) were also added in the evaluation functions as possible commands. Remembering
that, when these commands are evaluated, their respective functions are called from the
Generic Authentication behaviour module, which, then executes the functions from
the authentication callback module that is being used (and is specified in the server state,
inside the authentication setup).
Both Challenge-Response Authentication and the Certificate-Based Authentication
were implemented in callback modules of the Generic Authentication behaviour module,
and, as callback modules, they needed to implement the functions that were defined by
its behaviour module (described in its behaviour_info), which are the following callbacks:
• init(AuthenticationSettings, PersistenceSetup) — function that will be called by
gen_authentication at the initialization of the application;
– AuthenticationSettings: a proplist with the settings of the authentication mod-
ule;
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– PersistenceSetup: a tuple with the in-use persistence module and its settings
proplist;
– Expected Return: the atom ok or an error expression.
• handle_login(LoginArgs, PersistenceScheme, Socket) — function that will be called
by gen_authentication when a login command is executed;
– LoginArgs: a tuple containing the login arguments (e.g. username and pass-
word);
– PersistenceScheme: the in-use persistence module;
– Socket: the socket of the current connection;
– Expected Return: a tuple with the new authentication status (loggedIn or
loggedOut) and the user’s authentication information (which currently is only
the username).
• handle_logout(AuthenticationStatus) — function that will be called by the module
gen_authentication when a logout command is executed;
– AuthenticationStatus: a tuple with the current authentication status itself
(probably loggedIn) and the user’s authentication information (which currently
is only the username);
– Expected Return: a tuple with the new authentication status (which will prob-
ably be loggedOut) and the user’s authentication information (which will prob-
ably be none).
• handle_register(RegisterArgs, PersistenceScheme, Socket) — function that will be
called by gen_authentication when a register command is executed;
– RegisterArgs: a tuple containing the register arguments (e.g. username and
password);
– PersistenceScheme: the in-use persistence module;
– Socket: the socket of the current connection;
– Expected Return: a tuple with ok and the username or a tuple with error and
an expression with the error cause.
5.2.1 Challenge-Response Authentication
This challenge-response authentication mechanism was implemented in a module called
ADB Authentication (adb_authentication). As it is a callback module of the Generic
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Authentication, this subsection will basically discuss how each of its functions were im-
plemented.
init(AuthenticationSettings, PersistenceSetup)
This function just checks if the authentication database already exists. If it does not exist
yet, a new one is created, using the persistence module that was set in AngraDB start-up
configurations.
handle_login(LoginArgs, PersistenceScheme, Socket)
Since the keys to find the documents of the users inside the Authentication database are
SHA-256 hash values of the usernames, that is the first thing this function will do. After
the SHA-256 digest of the username is computed, this function uses it to retrieve the
user’s document from the Authentication database via the persistence module that was
passed as parameter (PersistenceScheme).
In case the document is not found, it means that the user with this username has
not been registered yet, so the authentication fails and the function returns the tuple
{loggedOut, invalid_password_or_username}.
In case the document is found, it is time to verify the response to the challenge, that
is, to check if the password is correct. The hash of the the user’s salted password and the
salt are then retrieved form the document.
After that, the password that has been typed by the user is passed to the PBKDF2
function along with the salt that was retrieved from the user authentication document.
The PBKDF2 function will be executed using SHA-512, being iterated 150,000 times, and
generating then a 512-bit digest, which will be compared to the one that was retrieved
from the document.
If the just-calculated digest is different from the one in the document, it means that the
password is not correct, so the function fails, and then returns the same tuple: {loggedOut,
invalid_password_or_username}. This error is the same for both invalid username and
invalid password in order to avoid giving sensitive information for a potential adversary.
In case the digest that was calculated moments ago matches with the digest that was
stored in the user authentication document, the function returns the tuple {loggedIn,
Username}, as a sign of success on the authentication.
Note: Since every document in AngraDB needs to be stored in JSON format, the
Erlang library "jsone" was used to transform JSON into Erlang proplists and vice-versa.
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handle_logout(AuthenticationStatus)
This function only returns the tuple {loggedOut, none}.
handle_register(RegisterArgs, PersistenceScheme, Socket)
This function looks a lot like handle_login. First, it calculates the SHA-256 hash of the
username, in order to use it as the key of the user document that will be saved in the
authentication database.
After that, a pseudo-random 22-character alphanumeric salt is generated. Having
the password (which is inside the "RegisterArgs" parameter) and the salt in hands, the
PBKDF2 function is applied with the same parameters as in handle_login: SHA-512 as
hash function, 150,000 iterations, and a 512-bit digest as output.
With the hash value of the salted password and the salt itself, the document is ready
to be created. Using the library jsone, the proplist with the digest of the salted password
and the salt are converted to JSON format, and, using the persistence module that was
set in the application start-up (and passed to this function via the "PersistenceScheme"
parameter), the JSON document is saved in the authentication database, using the SHA-
256 hash of the username as the document key.
5.2.2 Certificate-Based Authentication
The module that implemented this mechanism in AngraDB is called ADB Certificate
Authentication (adb_cert_authentication). As certificate-based authentication counts on
the SSL/TLS protocol to authenticate the user with his/her certificate, the only thing
this module needs to do is store some minimum information of the user, which are going
to be the username and the encoded certificate. Besides that, a list containing all the
in-use usernames will be stowed in a separate document as well (this list will be used to
prevent from repeating usernames while registering new users).
Disregarding the authentication scheme itself, the structure of how the documents
are stored, retrieved and manipulated is almost the same than the adb_authentication,
so the functions may look very similar too. Having all this said, we can now check the
adb_cert_authentication’s implementations of the gen_authentication callback functions.
init(AuthenticationSettings, PersistenceSetup)
As well as in adb_authentication module, this function also checks if the authentication
database exists. The difference is that, if it does not exist, besides creating a new one, it
also creates a document for the list of usernames, as said before.
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handle_login(LoginArgs, PersistenceScheme, Socket)
First, this function uses the Erlang SSL module to retrieve the client’s certificate, using
the Socket parameter. If it fails to retrieve the certificate — which is very unlikely,
since the SSL/TLS handshake had to occur successfully in order to the connection to be
established —, the login fails and the function returns the tuple {loggedOut, SSLError}.
If the certificate is retrieved, its SHA-256 digest is calculated, and using it as key, an at-
tempt to retrieve the user’s document is made in the authentication database. In case the
document is not found, authentication fails and the tuple {loggedOut, user_not_found} is
returned. Otherwise, the library jsone is used to decode the JSON document into a pro-
plist, the username is retrieved, and the function returns the tuple {loggedIn, Username},
finishing the authentication.
handle_logout(AuthenticationStatus)
Only returns the tuple {loggedOut, none} as well.
handle_register(RegisterArgs, PersistenceScheme, Socket)
As well as in handle_login, the Erlang SSL module is used to try to retrieve the client’s
certificate. If it fails, registration fails and the tuple {error, SSLError} is returned.
After retrieving the client’s certificate, its SHA-256 hash value is calculated, in order
to be used as key of the user’s authentication document as well. Just in case, the function
verifies, using the persistence module given by the parameter "PersistenceScheme", if any
document with this hash value already exists, that is, if this certificate has already been
registered. If so, registration fails as well, and the tuple {error, user_already_exists} is
returned.
Next, using the PersistenceScheme module, the document with the usernames is re-
trieved, and the username that was passed as an argument for the register command is
searched in the list. If it already exists, the registration process fails and the tuple {error,
username_already_exists} is returned.
After confirming that the given username is not in use, it is appended to beggining of
the list of usernames, which is then encoded into JSON, and its document is updated in
the database.
To finish the registration, the proplist with the username and the certificate is en-
coded into JSON, and it is then saved into the authentication database, using the Per-
sistenceScheme module. If it is successfully saved, the function returns the tuple {ok,
Username}; otherwise, the tuple {error, ErrorType} is returned.
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5.3 Authorization
As well as the Authentication scheme, the Authorization architecture was mainly focused
on the ADB Server module, which is the one that deals the external communication via
TCP.
The first step was also very similar to the Authentication scheme: the authorization
setup (the module and its settings) that will be used was also added to the state of the
server, in order to be available to the functions of ADB Server when needed. (Normally,
the callback modules are passed as parameter to the behaviour modules — that is, the
Generic modules —, so that they can know the module from which they are going to
execute the callbacks).
After the authentication scheme was implemented in ADB Server, right after the
parse of a TCP message, the tokens of the command would be evaluated, and, depending
on the authentication status of the user, the function evaluate_authenticated_request or
evaluate_not_authenticated_request would be executed, receiving the parsed tokens with
the command and its arguments as parameter.
It is in this point that the second step and major architectural change in ADB Server
will happen in order to implant the new Authorization scheme.
Instead of immediately calling the function evaluate_authenticated_request or evalu-
ate_not_authenticated_request after the verification of the authentication status of the
user in the current connection, it will first be checked, in case the user is already
authenticated, if the he/she has permission to perform the command that is going
to be evaluated, using the function request_permission of the Generic Authorization
module (gen_authorization). If the access is allowed, then the evaluation process of
the command continues, otherwise, a message is sent back to the user, saying that the
access to the desired action was denied. If the user was not authenticated yet, evalu-
ate_not_authenticated_request is called normally, without any permission request.
Other than that, but still talking about the changes in ADB Server, the other ex-
ported functions of the Generic Authorization module, such as grant_permission (grants
a permission to a specific user), revoke_permission (revokes the permission of a specific
user) and show_permission (shows the permission of a specific user), were added to the
list of evaluable commands inside the function evaluate_authenticated_request.
Now that the changes in ADB Server were discussed, it is possible to talk about what
is necessary to develop an authorization callback module for AngraDB.
In order to create a new Authorization module, it will be necessary to implement the
following callbacks of the Generic Authorization behaviour module (which are specified
in its behaviour_info):
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• init(AuthorizationSettings, PersistenceSetup) — function that will be called by
gen_authorization at the initialization of the application;
– AuthorizationSettings: a proplist with the settings of the authorization module;
– PersistenceSetup: a tuple with the in-use persistence module and its settings
proplist;
– Expected Return: the atom ok or an error expression.
• handle_request_permission(PersistenceScheme, Database, Username, Tokens) —
function that will be called by gen_authorization before the evaluation of a com-
mand, to see if the user has permission to execute a certain action or not;
– PersistenceScheme: the in-use persistence module;
– Database: the current connected database;
– Username: the username of the user that is authenticated in the current con-
nection;
– Tokens: a tuple with strings of the command and its arguments (e.g. {"cre-
ate_db", "MyDatabase"});
– Expected Return: a tuple with the result of the permission request (granted or
forbidden) and an expression that will hold any extra information.
• handle_grant_permission(PersistenceScheme, Database, GrantArgs)— function that
will be called by the module gen_authorization when a grant_permission com-
mand is executed;
– PersistenceScheme: the in-use persistence module;
– Database: the current connected database;
– GrantArgs: a tuple with the arguments that were passed by the user along
with the grant_permission command;
– Expected Return: a tuple with ok and the permission that was granted, or
error and an expression with the error cause.
• handle_revoke_permission(PersistenceScheme, Database, RevokeArgs) — function
that will be called by gen_authorization when a revoke_permission command is
executed;
– PersistenceScheme: the in-use persistence module;
– Database: the current connected database;
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– RevokeArgs: a tuple with the arguments that were passed by the user along
with the revoke_permission command;
– Expected Return: a tuple with ok and the permission that was revoked or a
tuple with error and an expression with the error cause.
• handle_show_permission(PersistenceScheme, Database, Username)— function that
will be called by gen_authorization when a show_permission command is exe-
cuted;
– PersistenceScheme: the in-use persistence module;
– Database: the current connected database;
– Username: the username of the user whose permission will be shown;
– Expected Return: a tuple with ok and the user’s permission on the specified
database or a tuple with error and an expression with the error cause.
5.3.1 Discretionary Access Control (DAC) Implementation
This access control mechanism that was developed is inside a module called Simple Au-
thorization (simple_authorization).
As it uses Access Control Lists (ACLs) as strategy to store the user’s permissions,
the Simple Authorization module will organize the permissions in documents that will be
stowed in the Authorization database. Each of these documents will represent a specific
database, and, inside each of them, there will be a list (proplist) composed by tuples of
users and their permissions upon this specific database.
Even though the permissions are stored in these documents as integers, as explained
in the previous chapter, the client, when using a command such as grant_permission, will
refer to a permission in its abbreviated form: "owner permission" ≡ "o"; "read and write
permission" ≡ "rw"; "read permission" ≡ "r"; "no permission" ≡ "n" or anything that is
not one of the previously mentioned.
An important point about how this module treats the permissions is that, in order to
know what permissions are required for each command, a constant list called Command-
sAndPermissions was created, containing tuples with the name of the command and the
required permission (as integers).
Another peculiarity about this authorization module that is important to mention
is that, when a new database is created, its respective authorization document is only
created when someone requests permission related to this very database. When done so,
this user that requested the permission for the first time earns owner permission of this
database.
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Now it is time to talk about how this authorization module implemented the callbacks
specified in the Generic Authorization behaviour module.
init(AuthorizationSettings, PersistenceSetup)
This function verifies if the authorization database has already been created. If it has
not yet, a new one is created, and authorization documents are also created for sensitive
databases — the authorization database and the authentication database. This is done to
avoid problems with the peculiarity that was mentioned, such as, for example, someone
trying to connect to one of these sensitive databases and earning owner permission upon
them.
handle_request_permission(PersistenceScheme, Database, Username, Tokens)
This is probably the main function that the callback modules need to implement, since it
is the function that indeed applies the access control.
As usual, the first thing to be done is calculate the SHA-256 hash value of the database
name, which is then used as key to retrieve the authorization document of this database.
As stated before, if the databse’s authorization document is not found, a new one
is created, containing a list of permissions with one entry: the user that first requested
permission to this database and its new owner permission.
If the authorization document is found, the JSON is decoded into a proplist. After
that, the function checks in this list if the user has any permission upon this database
(if none was found, it is considered that the user has no permission). Then, based on
the token of the command that was intended to be executed (extracted from the Tokens
parameter), its required permission is retrieved from the CommandsAndPermissions list,
and, finally, the two permissions are compared (the user’s permission and the command’s
required permission).
If the user’s permission is greater or equal than the one required for the command, then
the access is allowed and the function returns the tuple {granted, User_permission_string};
otherwise, the access is denied, and the function returns the tuple {forbidden, ErrorMes-
sage}.
handle_grant_permission(PersistenceScheme, Database, GrantArgs)
First, the SHA-256 hash of the database name is computed. After that, the permission
that was passed as argument, which is in the abbreviated format, is converted to integer
— "o" turns into 3, "rw" into 2, "r" into 1 and "n" into 0.
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With the hash value, the function retrieves the document of permissions using the
module given by PersistenceScheme, decodes the JSON into a proplist, and tries to find
the user in this list.
If the user and its permission is found in the proplist, its entry is replaced, having its
permission updated. After that, the list is encoded into JSON again and the document
is updated in the authorization database using the PersistenceScheme module.
However, if the user is not found in the proplist, a tuple with the username and
the desired permission is appended to the beginning of the list, then it is encoded into
JSON again, and the document is updated in the authorization database using the Per-
sistenceScheme module.
After one of these two possibilities, the grant ends successfully, and the function returns
the tuple {ok, GrantedPermission}.
handle_revoke_permission(PersistenceScheme, Database, RevokeArgs)
Again, the SHA-256 digest of the database name is calculated, and then used as key to
retrieve the authorization document of the specific database, using the persistence module
given by PersistenceScheme.
After retrieving the document, it is decoded into a proplist. The entry of this user is
deleted from this proplist of permissions, then the list is encoded back into JSON, and
the document is finally updated in the authorization database via the PersistenceScheme.
After that, the revocation is succeeded, and the function returns the tuple {ok, Revoked-
Permission}.
If any error occurs in mean time, during, for example, the retrieval of the document,
the revocation fails, and the function returns the tuple {error, ErrorMessage}.
handle_show_permission(PersistenceScheme, Database, Username)
The authorization document is retrieved via the PersistenceScheme module, using the
SHA-256 hash value of the database name. After that, the JSON is decoded into a proplist.
From this proplist, the user entry is retrieved, and then the function returns a tuple with
an ok and the permission of this user — {ok, UserPermission}. It is important to mention
that, if no entries were found for the specified user, the variable "UserPermission" of the
tuple will hold the value "NoPermission".
If the authorization document could not be retrieved in the beginning of the function,
it will return the tuple {error, ErrorMessage}.
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5.4 Transport Layer Security
This section will be a little shorter than the first two, since, for this requirement, it was not
developed an interface of creation that enables other people to implement new modules
and attach them in AngraDB (which was the case for Authentication and Authorization).
For the problem of security of the transport layer, all the efforts were taken to add the
SSL/TLS protocol as a possible configuration in AngraDB.
This goal was achieved by using Erlang tools themselves, which provide a SSL module
(ssl) that includes functions, for example, to listen to new connections, to accept a new
connection, to send messages, to perform the SSL/TLS handshake and so on.
The changes started in the AngraDB start-up configurations. There, it is now possible
to add a SSL entry to the settings proplist. In this entry, there will be the paths to the
files that are needed to make the SSL protocol work, which are the server certificate, the
file with its private key, and the file with its CAs’ certificates.
Summarizing this first step: to set AngraDB to use SSL/TLS, it is necessary to add an
"ssl" entry in the AngraDB start-up proplist (inside the file "adb_core.app"), containing
the paths to the certificates and keys that are necessary to make the SSL/TLS protocol
work, as it can be observed in Figure 5.3.
Figure 5.3: Example of AngraDB start-up settings, including SSL configurations..
These configurations will be used in the initialization of Server Supervisor (server_sup).
Before, the Erlang TCP module (gen_tcp) was started at the initialization of AngraDB.
Now, inside a function of the Server Supervisor called setup_communication, instead of
immediately starting the TCP module, an attempt to retrieve the SSL configurations
is made. If no configuration is found, then TCP module is initialized as it was before.
Otherwise, the SSL module is started with the configurations that were given.
After that, the Server Supervisor, when instantiating a new ADB Server, will also
include the communication module that will be used (either gen_tcp or the ssl module)
to the list of parameters for the ADB Server instantiation. This communication module,
as well as the other modules that were passed as parameter to the new instance of the
ADB server, is now also stored in the ADB Server state.
Inside the ADB Server, when initializing, it used to immediately accept a new TCP
connection (this accept function from the gen_tcp module is a blocking function that
basically waits for a new connection and accepts it when an attempt of connection is
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made). Now, depending on the communication module that is being used (gen_tcp or
ssl), it will either accept a TCP connection directly, or accept a SSL connection and
perform the SSL/TLS handshake.
The last change lies on how ADB Server used to send messages to the connected
client. Before, the messages were all sent by using the gen_tcp:send function. Now, the
server state will tell what communication module will be used to call the send function.
For example, if SSL is set as the in-use communication module in the server state, then




Developing the first security design for AngraDB was quite challenging, but it was possible
to learn a lot from these very challenges. Security, cryptography, programming in Erlang
and working in an open source project are just a few examples of the things that I have
learned or improved with this work.
Regarding what was implemented, there are some things that need adjustments. Some
messages and even API are still a little inflexible. For instance, although the login com-
mand only needs the username as argument when using Certificate-Based authentication,
the server still sends a message saying that, in order to authenticate, the user should use
the command "login [username] [password]". Another example is the API of the Generic
Authorization behaviour module, which uses "permissions" in names of the functions,
even though there some access control models that do not use "permissions", such as the
Role-Based Access Control (RBAC).
Furthermore, creating a new module to be used in AngraDB could be even easier if
it was not necessary to change any AngraDB existing code when doing so. Currently, in
order to use a new module — either persistence or security module —, it is required to add
this very module as an option on the functions setup_persistence, setup_authentication or
setup_authorization, inside the Server Supervisor module, besides setting up this desired
module in AngraDB start-up configurations. Instead, things will be much easier and less
bug-prone if the only necessary step was changing the AngraDB start-up configurations
(which are not even in the source folder of the repository).
Also, as stated previously in the section 4.4 (Evaluation Based On Attack Models),
even though this work has been a breakthrough for AngraDB in terms of security, it still
has a lotmore to improve, both regarding what is already done (by enhancing the existing
security modules and discovering new flaws and breaches on the current implementation,
for example), and also in regard to adding new security modules (such as an Audit, an
Encryption, or a Role-Based Authorization module) and new features to prevent attacks
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that were not thought in this work, such as the mentioned Denial-of-Service (DoS) attack,
for instance.
Besides that, security is a matter that is in constant change: vulnerabilities on the
safest protocols are found; new stronger cryptographic algorithms are released; compu-
tational power is increased every year. Having this said, we can conclude that there are
always new improvements to be done.
Note: All the code that has been developed in this work can be found in the An-
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